What do democracies and dictatorships have in common




















Voters may feel apathetic when they come to believe that they will no longer make a difference in average politics. Voters may experience alienation when their political choices fail to reflect their democratic interests. This is particularly dangerous, as this presents an opportunity for authoritarian-minded political leaders to start curtailing political rights for minority groups, if not the entire national population. This can then start a backslide into dictatorship when the democratic voice becomes permanently suppressed, eliminating any kind of recourse against undemocratic policies such as voter suppression or encroachments onto free speech.

Hungary, as many political observers have noted over the past decade, is a profound case of democratic decline towards illiberalism, if not an outright march towards authoritarianism. Since , Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his political party, Fidesz, have dominated Hungarian politics through a combination of populist demagoguery and pernicious political engineering which have ensured repeated electoral success over the past three election cycles.

These upheavals caused mass unemployment, creating a sense of resentment to the social-democratic and liberal parties whose policies led to the situation. Orban has also repeatedly attacked international and European institutions in Hungary while expressing a vitriolic attitude towards economic and political globalism.

Fidesz has maintained a tight grip on Hungarian politics over the past decade, despite spirited attempts by the opposition to eject the right-wing party from power. Orban and his party have successfully established a stranglehold on the institutions of government, having taken control of the courts , revised the Hungarian constitution , and gerrymandered the electoral districts to favor their party.

Perhaps now more than ever, citizens in democratic countries must work to prevent the encroachment of dictatorial politics into democracies.

We must do more than just simply understand past historical examples of democratic decline; we must go further and make sure these historical examples do not happen again. The first step is to recommit to democratic principles and embrace them wholeheartedly. Strongmen often turn their ireful gaze onto many different groups, including minorities, immigrants, the political opposition, and established national leaders; strongmen tend to view these groups as both personal and national enemies.

Strongmen need to be stopped at the polls. Elections tend to affirm strongmen by giving them a popular mandate for their regime, but their respect for democracy ends the day after the election. Beating strongmen means not giving them a position of power to abuse in the first place, or by denying them a mandate and voting them out of power. Ultimately, the best way to protect democracies against becoming a dictatorship is to continue embracing democratic practices.

Voters need to make conscientious electoral choices that reject candidates or political groups that threaten to undermine the democratic process. Maintaining democracy requires voters to become yet more steadfast in their empathy towards others and participating in national politics with a frame of mind towards cooperation and understanding. The Renew Democracy Initiative, Inc is a c 3 not-for-profit organization.

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Ways Dictators Come to Power in a Democracy Dictators may rise to power in a democracy through several ways. Political Radicalization and Social Desperation Democracies are characterized by lively but peaceful debate between a variety of political parties and interest groups.

Representatives of the Nazi Party first two left , German Centrist Party middle , the Social Democratic Party middle-right , and the Communist Party far right canvassing before the Elections, the last free elections before the rise of Nazi Germany. Credit: HistoryToday After six years of recovery and even some economic prosperity for Germany, the Great Depression of once again threw Weimar Germany in a desperate economic state, prompting many German voters to seek radical political options, including National Socialism.

Such a degree of discipline and cohesion could be obtained only upon the basis of a highly efficient party organization and popular enthusiasm. It may be objected that only in a totalitarian state could such conditions obtain, but we cannot assume that this is so. There is no reason why those who believe in the maintenance of parliamentary, democratic, and liberal institutions should not prove as effective in organization and propaganda as the advocates of a Communist or Fascist dictatorship.

If democracy could organize itself in some such way as that described above, it could direct the economic mechanism if that were found essential to the survival of parliamentary government. If such a government proved successful in carrying on the economic functions of a country, there would be no serious internal threat of its overthrow. Even if there were times of temporary economic crisis, the survival of parliamentarianism would depend only on the nerves of its leaders.

In a world in which the example of existing dictatorships naturally encourages would-be Hitlers to try their luck, national leaders of democracies do not dare to be pacifists. The ease with which dictators seized power in Russia, Germany, and Italy does not prove by any means that parliamentary governments will always collapse before the mouth-ings of any swashbuckler.

Dictators came to power, partly because the leaders of the governments which were overthrown had lost all confidence in their ability to rescue their countries from the morass, and partly because they did not have the will to fight.

But leaders of parliamentary government before now have been willing and able to conduct both civil and foreign wars. It does not follow, therefore, that heads of parliamentary states need always be persons who are frightened at the threat of bloodshed. If it were true that the heads of the states which still are without dictators could always be coerced into resigning by the threat of civil war, then of course no democratic government could resist effectively.

It must be repeated, however, that history demonstrates that the heads of democracies are not invariably chicken-livered. The conclusion must be, therefore, that the ability of democratic and parliamentary institutions to survive depends primarily upon whether or not economic depressions can be overcome within the limits of these institutions. For we must face the fact that if we retain our existing economic system entirely without change, depressions such as the present one are certain to re-occur.

It is probable, however, that the basic elements of our political institutions as well as the essential elements of our culture might be retained even if economic institutions had to be altered. But intelligence of the highest order would be required to work out the mechanism of control of such a politico-economic system.

If tolerable economic conditions can be maintained, mass support for dictatorships will not reach a dangerous weight, and resolute leaders can always defend their governments against an occasional putsch. On the other hand, if democratic and parliamentary governments cannot deal with the present economic depression, or a subsequent one, such governments are certainly doomed. It must never be forgotten that under dictatorships people will endure economic conditions so bad that if similar conditions existed under parliamentary governments, they would be overthrown in a moment.

It is not necessary to demonstrate that a dictatorship could solve the economic problems of the modern world any better than can parliamentary governments.

All that is necessary to doom parliamentary governments is for economic conditions to become intolerable. Under such circumstances, sufficient mass support can be counted upon to provide the force for the triumph of a dictator. We have, up to now, discussed the matter as though the destruction of parliamentarianism and the coming of the totalitarian state depended only upon forces operating from within each country.

This is manifestly untrue. Aside from the contagion of ideas, it is probable that in Europe the spread of the institution of the totalitarian state will depend primarily upon forces from without rather than upon forces within. All totalitarian states have in common the explosive elements of the cult of force allied with the urge to expansion. This urge to expansion may take either the form of the dissemination of the doctrines of the faith to the unenlightened with the edge of the sword, or the form of territorial expansion, or a combination of both.

Moreover, this urge to expansion affects not only the destinies of countries which retain the parliamentary form of government but the destinies of other totalitarian states as well. Consequently, the future of both the parliamentary and the totalitarian states will be vitally affected by the course and outcome of the next war.

The possible permutations and combinations of the next war in Europe are so many that no one can prophesy with any certainty its effect upon the development of political and economic institutions. The forces and factors which are involved are too unpredictable. Will France allow Germany to absorb Austria without war Probably. Probably not. If France fails to intervene in either case, the result will be German hegemony in Europe.

Germany would thereafter annex some portions of the Slav states adjoining her and would organize the remainder as protectorates. All would come under the regis of the German totalitarian state. There can be little doubt that Hitler could wage the wars necessary to attain these ends with little chance of defeat, always supposing that France did not move during the early stages of the process.

The military glory and renown which German armies would win in a series of sharp but brief and decisive campaigns would immensely increase the prestige of the National Socialist regime.

It is quite possible that, if the French abandoned the Poles and the other Slavic states, Hitler would be content to allow the status quo in Western Europe to remain undisturbed.

If Italy, France, and England acquiesced in German dominance of Slavic Europe and the Balkans and accepted the fact of overwhelming German military superiority, they might be allowed to exist without serious molestation and might, perhaps, retain any type of political institution which they liked. In this case the possibility of the creation of new totalitarian states in France and England would depend primarily on internal forces.

It would then be uncertain whether the Russian and German dictatorships could arrive at a modus vivendi which would permit them to exist side by side, or whether there would be a struggle to the death between them. Doubtless, non-European factors, such as the possibility of co-operation by a Japanese totalitarian state in the dismemberment of Russia, would determine whether the Communist and the National Socialist states would find it desirable to come to an agreement.

If the next European war comes within two or three years and if France supports her allies, it is conceivable that events would develop quite differently. Germany might, indeed, triumph in the struggle anyhow, and the results would then be as described above.

But in a prolonged struggle which necessitated arming the working classes of Germany and requiring them to engage in protracted warfare, it is probable that the National Socialists would be overthrown by the Communists and that the Russian type of the totalitarian state rather than the Prussian would dominate Europe.

In either event it is quite likely that the eventual result would be the erection of a few great Caesarian states which would dominate the principal land and sea areas. In summary, certain general principles follow from the argument outlined above. The urge to expansion exists in all the totalitarian states.

This urge leads to armed conflict with other countries, regardless of whether they are totalitarian or parliamentary in their political institutions. The issue of such conflicts will profoundly affect the particular type of totalitarian state which is likely to come into existence. Consequently, upon the issue of the next European war will probably depend the decision as to whether subsequent totalitarian states will be of the National Socialist or Communist types.

Finally, it is possible that after the formative period has come to an end, a few great Caesarian states might exist, each within a natural economic area and with a certain degree of tolerance for each other. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that external and internal forces which are operative now and are likely to be operative in the future render the survival of the liberal, democratic, and parliamentary state doubtful. The writer believes that the chance for its survival in the United States is better than in any other country.

But that is another story. View cart Subscribe Login. How to Give Why Give? How to Give Store. Dictators and Democracies By Calvin B. II One cannot, then, find a common technique in the methods by which the three dictatorships seized power.

III What are the conditions under which it is possible for any type of totalitarian state to supplant a parliamentary regime? IV We have, up to now, discussed the matter as though the destruction of parliamentarianism and the coming of the totalitarian state depended only upon forces operating from within each country. Issue: Spring Volume 10 2. Leave a tip. Both types of government can be effective or infective depending on several factors that may involve the particular individual holding the executive authority.

A dictatorship is generally a poor form or governance. Both systems are designed to effectively control the people only that in democracies people think that the ruling elite has their consent to rule Diamond and Marc Democracy and dictatorship differ in many ways.

The differences mainly pertain to the concept of governance and the methodology applied Bueno, Alastair and Morrow A dictator exercises absolute power and often formulates laws that are meant to suppress competition.

On the other hand, the choice to create the rules of governance and other regulations is usually made by the people. In democracies, people are given a chance to choose what works best for them. In a dictatorship, an individual or a small group of influential persons make choices on behalf of the people. The laws that govern the rights of people and the economy are framed for the people in a dictatorship Bueno, Alastair and Morrow On the hand, democracies give people the power to make laws. The freedoms and rights of citizens, media, civil society, and other organizations are often curtailed in dictatorial systems of governance.

People are often not allowed to say what they think is right for them. In democracies, citizens, media, civil society, and other organizations are usually free to initiate any meaningful change. This paper sought to identify the similarities and differences between democracy and dictatorship. Both have been identified as systems of governance which have very few similarities unless the principles of democracy are compromised to bring in some elements of dictatorship.

However, the two are different in several ways that mainly relate to the rights and freedoms of citizens and the concentration of power.



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